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This is one of ten studies for the Copenhagen Consensus Project that sought to 
evaluate the most feasible opportunities to improve welfare globally and alleviate poverty 
in developing countries. It argues that phasing out distortionary government subsidies and 
barriers to international trade will yield an extraordinarily high benefit-cost ratio. A 
survey is provided of recent estimates, using global economy wide simulation models, of 
the benefits of doing that via the current Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
Even if adjustment costs are several times as large as suggested by available estimates, 
the benefit-cost ratio from seizing this opportunity exceeds 20. That is much higher than 
the rewards from regional or bilateral trade agreements or from providing preferential 
access for least-developed countries’ exports to high-income countries. Such reform 
would simultaneously contribute to alleviating several of the other key challenges 




Key words:  trade policy reform, subsidy reduction, Doha Development Agenda 
 
 





Development Research Group 
Mailstop MC3-303 
World Bank 
1818 H Street NW 
Washington DC 20433  USA 
Phone +1 202 473 3387 
Fax     +1 202 522 1159 
kanderson@worldbank.org 
  







  The Copenhagen Consensus project is looking for an answer to the question: If 
there was a desire to spend US$50 billion over the next five years to improve the world, 
what opportunity offers the highest payoff? This paper argues that putting effort into 
phasing out wasteful subsidies and trade barriers should be ranked highly among the 
opportunities being addressed in this project, for three reasons: 
•  It would require only a small fraction of that $50 billion to make a significant 
impact in this area via greater advocacy, and cuts to subsidies could reduce 
government outlays by hundreds of millions of dollars, leaving plenty to spend on 
the next-best opportunity; 
•  Trade reform would allow citizens also to spend more on other pressing problems 
(because under freer trade the world’s resources would be allocated more 
efficiently), thereby indirectly contributing to opportunities to alleviate other 
challenges; and 
•  Trade reform would also directly alleviate poverty and thereby reduce 
environmental degradation and address some of the other challenges identified in 
this project, namely climate change, communicable diseases, conflicts and arms 
proliferation, education under-investment, financial instability, poor governance 
and corruption, population and migration issues, water issues, and under-nutrition 
and hunger. 
 
1. The  challenge 
 
  Despite the net economic and social benefits of reducing most government 
subsidies
1 and opening economies to trade, almost every national government intervenes 
in markets for goods and services in ways that distort international commerce. Those 
distortionary policies harm most the economies imposing them, but the worst of them (in 
agriculture and clothing) are particularly harmful to the world’s poorest people. The 
challenge addressed in this paper is to rid the world of such wasteful and anti-poor 
policies. The geographic scope is thus global, although some of the opportunities for 
alleviating the problem involve action by just subsets of the world’s national 
governments.  
                                                 
1 Not all subsidies are welfare-reducing, and in some cases a subsidy-cum-tax will be optimal to overcome 
a gap between private and social costs that cannot be bridged à la Coase (1960). Throughout this paper all 
references to ‘cutting subsidies’ refer to bringing them back to their optimal level (which will be zero in all 





To keep the task manageable, the policy instruments considered will be limited to 
those trade-related ones over which a government’s international trade negotiators have 
some influence both at home and abroad. That thereby excludes measures such as generic 
taxes on income, consumption and value added, government spending on mainstream 
public services, infrastructure and generic social safety nets in strong demand by the 
community, and subsidies (taxes) and related measures set optimally from the national 
viewpoint to overcome positive (negative) environmental or other externalities. Also 
excluded from consideration here are foreign exchange policies. 
This challenge in its modern form has been with us for about 75 years. The latter 
part of the nineteenth century saw a strong movement toward laissez faire, but that 
development was reversed following the first world war in ways that led to the Great 
Depression of the early 1930s and the conflict that followed (Kindleberger 1989). It was 
during the second world war, in 1944, that a conference at Bretton Woods proposed an 
International Trade Organization. An ITO charter was drawn up by 1948 along with a 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but the ITO idea died when the United 
States failed to progress it through Congress (Diebold 1952). Despite that, the GATT 
during its 47-year history (before it was absorbed into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) on 1 January 1995) oversaw the gradual lowering of many tariffs on imports of 
manufactured goods by governments of developed countries. Manufacturing tariffs 
remained high in developing countries, however, and distortionary subsidies and trade 
policies affecting agricultural and services markets of both rich and poor countries 
continued to hamper efficient resource allocation, economic growth and poverty 
alleviation.  
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations led to agreements signed in 
1994 that have seen some trade liberalization over the subsequent 10 years. But even 
when those agreements are fully implemented by end-2004, and despite additional 
unilateral trade liberalizations since the 1980s by a number of countries (particularly 
developing and transition economies), many subsidies and trade distortions will remain. 
They include not just trade taxes-cum-subsidies but also contingent protection measures 
such as anti-dumping, regulatory standards that can be technical barriers to trade, and 
domestic production subsidies (allegedly decoupled in the case of some farm support 
programs but in fact only partially so). Insufficient or excessive taxation or quantitative 
regulations in the presence of externalities such as pollution also lead to inefficiencies 
and can be trade distorting. Furthermore, the on-going proliferation of preferential trading 
and bilateral or regional integration arrangements – for which there would be little or no 
need in the absence of trade barriers – is adding complexity to international economic 
relations. In some cases those arrangements are leading to trade and investment diversion 
rather than creation. 
  The reluctance to reduce trade distortions is almost never because such policy 
reform involves government treasury outlays. On the contrary, except in the case of a 
handful of low-income countries still heavily dependent on trade taxes for government 
revenue, such reform may well benefit the treasury (by raising income and/or 
consumption tax revenues more than trade tax revenues fall, not to mention any payments 
foregone because of cuts to subsidy programs). Rather, distortions remain largely because 
further trade liberalization and subsidy cuts redistribute jobs, income and wealth in ways 





possibly their own wealth in countries where corruption is rife). The challenge involves 
finding politically attractive ways to phase out remaining distortions to world markets for 
goods, services, capital and potentially even labor.  
This paper focuses primarily on distortions at national borders (trade taxes and 
subsidies, quantitative restrictions on international trade, and technical barriers to trade) 
plus a few significantly trade-distorting production subsidies. While global in coverage, 
the paper distinguishes between policies of developed countries and those of developing 
(including former socialist and least-developed) countries. Among other things, it 
emphasizes the consequences, in the absence of other policy changes, for the UN’s key 
Millennium Development Goals as encapsulated in the other nine challenges being 
addressed by the Copenhagen Consensus project – since trade reform, perhaps more than 
any of the other opportunities under consideration, has the potential to impact positively 
on most of those challenges. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the arguments for 
removing trade distortions, along with critiques by sceptics. This includes examining not 
only the economic benefits, and costs but also the social and environmental consequences 
of such reform, to make the case that opening markets is a worthy cause. Four 
opportunities to reduce these distortions over the next five years are then laid out in 
Section 3. They are, in decreasing order of potential contribution to global openness and 
economic growth: full trade liberalization globally (to provide more a benchmark than a 
politically likely scenario), non-preferential legally binding trade liberalization following 
the WTO’s current Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations, a reciprocal preferential 
agreement in the form of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and a non-
reciprocal preferential agreement by OECD countries to provide least-developed 
countries with duty-free market access for their exports of everything but arms (EBA).
2 
The core of the paper is Section 4, where estimates of the economic benefits and costs of 
these opportunities are presented, along with a methodological critique of the various 
empirical studies surveyed, an assessment of the likely social and environmental 
consequences of reducing subsidies and trade barriers,




                                                 
2 A non-preferential but non-binding trade liberalization opportunity by the Pacific rim members of APEC 
is also mentioned in Section 3, but it is not considered in detail because its time frame is to 2020 and in any 
case it is a subset of the opportunity to move to global free trade. 
3 Throughout the paper, governmental ‘triple bottom line’ terminology is used to distinguish economic 
effects from social and environmental effects, rather than the economist’s standard terminology of private 









  Even before examining the empirical estimates of the costs and benefits from 
grasping various trade-liberalizing opportunities, the case can be made that such reform 
in principle is beneficial economically. It then remains to examine whether particular 
reforms are also at least benign in terms of social and environmental outcomes. The latter 
is particularly important because there are many non-economists who believe or assume 
the social and/or environmental consequences are adverse and seek to persuade others 
through such means as mass (and sometimes violent) street protests. 
 
2.1 Static economic gains from own-country reform 
 
  The standard comparative static analysis of national gains from international trade 
emphasizes the economic benefits from production specialization and exchange so as to 
exploit comparative advantage in situations where a nation’s costs of production and/or 
preferences differ from those in the rest of the world. This is part of the more general 
theory of the welfare effects of distortions in a trading economy, as summarized by 
Bhagwati (1971). Domestic industries become more productive as those with a 
comparative advantage expand by drawing resources from those previously protected or 
subsidized industries that grow slower or contract following reform. 
The static gains from trade tend to be greater as a share of national output the 
smaller the economy, particularly where economies of scale in production have not been 
fully exploited and where consumers (including firms importing intermediate inputs) 
value variety so that intra- as well as inter-industry trade can flourish.
4 In such cases the 
more-efficient firms within expanding industries tend to take over the less efficient ones. 
Indeed theory and empirical studies suggest the shifting of resources within an industry 
may be more welfare-improving than shifts between industries.
5 They are also greater the 
more trade barriers have allowed imperfect competition to prevail in the domestic 
marketplace, which again is more common in smaller economies where industries have 
commensurately smaller numbers of firms. 
 
2.2 Dynamic economic gains from own-country reform 
 
  To the standard comparative static analysis needs to be added links between trade 
and economic growth. The mechanisms by which openness contributes to growth are 
                                                 
4 Some may question the value of intra-industry trade, given that transaction costs such as freight can be 
non-trivial, but consumers are willing to pay for a greater variety of products. Those consumers include 
producers using those products as intermediate inputs. Feenstra et al. (1992) suggest the welfare cost of 
tariff protection can be underestimated by as much as a factor of ten when this consideration is not 
included. In a study of US import data from 1972 to 2001, Broda and Weinstein (2004) find that the 
upward bias in the conventional import price index, because of not accounting for the growth in varieties of 
products, is approximately 1.2 percent per year, and suggest that the welfare gain from variety growth in 
US imports alone is 2.8 percent of GDP. 
 





gradually getting to be better understood by economists, thanks to the pioneering work of 
such theorists as Grossman and Helpman (1991), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and the 
literature those studies spawned. In a helpful survey of the subsequent literature, Taylor 
(1999) identifies several channels through which openness to trade can affect an 
economy’s growth rate. They include the scale of the market when knowledge is 
embodied in the products traded, the degree of redundant knowledge creation that is 
avoided through openness (Romer 1994), and the effect of knowledge spillovers.
6 More 
importantly from a policy maker’s viewpoint, the available empirical evidence strongly 
supports the view that open economies grow faster (see the survey by USITC 1997).  
Notable econometric studies of the linkage between trade reform and the rate of 
economic growth include those by Sachs and Warner (1995) and Frankel and Romer 
(1999). More recent studies also provide some indirect supportive econometric evidence. 
For example, freeing up the importation of intermediate and capital goods promotes 
investments that increase growth (Wacziarg 2001). Indeed, the higher the ratio of 
imported to domestically produced capital goods for a developing country, the faster it 
grows (Lee 1995; Mazumdar 2001). Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) examine a number of 
such studies and claim the results they surveyed are not robust. However, in a more 
recent study that revisits the Sachs and Warner data and then provides new time-series 
evidence, Wacziarg and Welch (2003) show that dates of trade liberalization do 
characterize breaks in investment and GDP growth rates. Specifically, for the 1950-1998 
period, countries that have liberalized their trade (raising their trade-to-GDP ratio by an 
average of 5 percentage points) have enjoyed on average 1.5 percentage points higher 
GDP growth compared with their pre-reform rate. There have also been myriad case 
studies of liberalization episodes. In a survey of 36 of them, Greenaway (1993) reminds 
us that many things in addition to trade policies were changing during the studied cases, 
so ascribing causality is not easy. That, together with some econometric studies that fail 
to find that positive link, has led Freeman (2003) to suggest the promise of raising the 
rate of economic growth through trade reform has been overstated. The same could be 
(and has been) said about the contributions to growth of such things as investments in 
education, health, agricultural research, and so on (Easterly 2001). A more-general and 
more-robust conclusion that Easterly draws from empirical evidence, though, is that 
people respond to incentives. Hence getting incentives right in factor and product markets 
is crucial – and removing unwarranted subsidies and trade barriers is an important part of 
that process. Additional evidence from 13 new case studies reported in Wacziarg and 
Welch (2003) adds further empirical support to that view, as does the fact that there are 
no examples of autarkic economies that have enjoyed sustained economic growth, in 
contrast to the many examples since the 1960s of reformed economies that boomed after 
opening up. 
Specifically, economies that commit to less market intervention tend to attract 
more investment funds, ceteris paribus, which raise their stocks of capital (through 
greater aggregate global savings or at the expense of other economies’ capital stocks). 
More-open economies also tend to be more innovative, because of greater trade in 
intellectual capital (information, ideas and technologies, sometimes but not only in the 
                                                 
6 Openness allows society’s knowledge capital to grow faster. If an x percent increase in that stock 
generates an increase of more than x percent in individual firms’ outputs, as assumed by Romer (1986) and 





form of purchasable intellectual property). Trade liberalization can thereby lead not just 
to a larger capital stock and a one-off increase in productivity but also to higher rates of 
capital accumulation and productivity growth in the reforming economy because of the 
way reform energizes entrepreneurs. For those higher growth rates to be sustained, 
though, there is widespread agreement that governments also need to (a) have in place 
effective institutions to efficiently allocate and protect property rights, (b) allow domestic 
factor and product markets to function freely, and (c) maintain macroeconomic and 
political stability (Rodrik 2003; Wacziarg and Welch 2003; Baldwin 2004). Or to 
paraphrase Panagariya (2004), trade openness is necessary, but may not be a sufficient 
condition, for sustained economic growth. 
 
2.3 Why, then, are countries protectionist? 
 
  Despite the evident economic gains from removing trade distortions, most 
countries retain protection from foreign competition for at least some of their industries. 
Numerous reasons have been suggested as to why a country imposes trade barriers in the 
first place (infant industry assistance, unemployment prevention, balance of payments 
maintenance, tax revenue raising, protection of environmental or labor standards, etc.). 
All of them are found wanting in almost all circumstances in that a lower-cost domestic 
policy instrument is available to meet each of those objectives (Corden 1997; Bhagwati 
1988), but nonetheless there are well-meaning people who still believe trade measures are 
needed for one or other of those reasons or to avoid the social costs associated with 
removing them. So part of the present challenge is to convince such people that the gains 
from reform would far exceed the costs and that there are more-direct means of 
addressing their concerns.  
The more difficult part of reforming trade policies relates to the fact that the most 
compelling explanation for their persistence is a political economy one. The changes in 
product prices that result from trade liberalization or subsidy cuts necessarily change the 
prices for the services of productive factors such as land, labor and capital. Hence even 
though the aggregate income and wealth of a nation may be expected to grow when trade 
distortions are reduced, not everyone need gain and social safety nets, where they exist, 
typically provide only partial compensation for such losses. This is the source of 
resistance to policy reforms: the expected losses in jobs, income and wealth are 
concentrated in the hands of a few who are prepared to support politicians who resist 
protection cuts, while the gains are sufficiently small per consumer and export firm and 
are distributed sufficiently widely as to make it not worthwhile for those potential gainers 
(not to mention foreign producers/exporters) to get together to lobby for reform, 
particularly given their greater free-rider problem in acting collectively (Hillman 1989; 
Grossman and Helpman 1994). Thus the observed pattern of protection in a country at a 
point in time may well be an equilibrium outcome in a national political market for policy 






2.4 What can induce reductions in subsidies and trade barriers? 
 
  That political market equilibrium may indeed be altered from time to time. 
Changes are induced by such things as better information dissemination, technological 
changes, reforms abroad, and new opportunities to join international trade agreements. 
 
2.4.1 Better information dissemination 
 
One way that political markets for policy intervention change is better 
dissemination (e.g., by national or international bureaucrats, think tanks, local export 
industries, foreign import suppliers) of more-convincing information on the benefits to 
consumers, exporters and the overall economy from reducing subsidies and trade 
distortions, and on alternative means of achieving society’s other objectives more 
efficiently, so as to balance the views of single-issue non-government organizations 
(NGOs), labor unions and the like who tend to focus only on the (often over-stated) costs 
of reform to their constituents. During the past two decades the spreading of more 
balanced benefit/cost information has contributed to unilateral economic reforms and a 
consequent opening to trade in numerous developing countries as well as richer countries 
such as Australia and New Zealand. More recently several major NGOs, together with 
the OECD Secretariat, have begun to focus on providing better information about the 
wastefulness of environmentally harmful subsidies that has already started to have an 
impact (e.g. in reducing coal mining subsidies in Europe). 
 
2.4.2 Technological change 
 
Another way the political equilibrium is altered is technological innovation. The 
information and telecommunications revolution of the past two decades, for example, has 
dramatically lowered the costs of doing business across national borders, just as 
happened with the arrival of steamships and the telegraph during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. That increased trading opportunity has made (actual or potential) 
exporters more eager to get together to counter the anti-trade lobbying of import-
protected groups and NGOs. 
 
2.4.3 Unilateral opening of markets abroad 
 
A country’s political equilibrium could be upset also by trade opening by one or 
more other countries, in so far as those reforms alter international prices and volumes of 
trade and foreign investment and provide greater market access opportunities for 
exporters. Such opening abroad also adds to the evidence of the net gains and 
(particularly in the case of phased reforms) the relatively low adjustment costs associated 
with trade reform, making it easier for exporters to counter the alarmist lobbying of 
protectionists.  
A coincidence of this and the previous two types of shocks has given rise to the 
latest wave of globalization. This is raising not only the rewards to economies practicing 
good economic governance but also the cost of retaining poor economic governance. Just 





than ever before, so it can equally quickly be withdrawn if confidence in that economy’s 
governance is shaken – as the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s demonstrated 
all too clearly. A crucial element of good economic governance is a commitment to a 
permanently open international trade and payments regime (along with sound domestic 
policies such as an absence of subsidies, secure property rights and prudent monetary and 
fiscal policies).  
 
2.4.4 Opportunities to join international trade agreements  
 
In seeking to find politically expedient ways to open their economies, 
governments are increasingly looking for opportunities to do so bilaterally, regionally or 
multilaterally. The reason is that the political market equilibrium in two or more countries 
can be altered in favor of liberalism through an exchange of product market access. If 
country A allows more imports, it may well harm its import-competing producers if there 
are insufficient compensation mechanisms; but if this liberalization is done in return for 
country A’s trading partners lowering their barriers to A’s exports, the producers of those 
exports will be better off. The latter extra benefit may be sufficiently greater than the loss 
to A’s import-competing producers that A’s liberalizing politicians too become net 
gainers in terms of electoral, financial or other support in return for negotiating a trade 
agreement. When politicians in the countries trading with A also see the possibility for 
gaining from such an exchange of market access, for equal and opposite reasons, 
prospects for trade negotiations are ripe.
7  
Such gains from trade negotiations involving exchange of market access are 
potentially greater nationally and globally, the larger the number of countries involved 
and the broader the product and issues coverage of the negotiations. That is the logic 
behind negotiating multilaterally with nearly 150 WTO member countries over a wide 
range of sectors and issues. That WTO process is becoming increasingly cumbersome, 
however, which has led countries also to negotiate bilaterally or regionally in the hope 
that faster and deeper integration will result. Preferential free trade areas involving just a 
subset of countries need not be welfare-enhancing for all participant nations, however, 
because of trade diversion away from the lowest-cost supplier; and non-participants in the 
rest of the world may be made worse off too (Pomfret 1997; Schiff and Winters 2003). 
Hence the need for empirical analysis of the likely gains from different types of 
prospective trade agreements. 
 
2.5 What about the social and environmental consequences of trade reform? 
 
  Trade liberalization in recent years has attracted a considerable amount of 
attention of NGOs, as witnessed by their presence on the streets of cities where trade 
ministers meet (e.g., during the WTO Ministerial in Seattle in late 1999). The groups 
attracted see trade reform as contributing to the spread of capitalism and in particular of 
multinational firms, and believe those aspects of globalization add to innumerable social 
and environmental ills in both rich and poor countries. But just as the traditional 
                                                 
7 Elaborations of this economists’ perspective can be found in Grossman and Helpman (1995), Hillman and 
Moser (1995), Maggi and Rodrigeuz-Clare (1998), and Hoekman and Kostecki (2001). Political scientists 





economic arguments for protection have been found wanting, so too have the social and 
environmental ones both conceptually and empirically. For example, there has not been a 
systematic ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental or labor standards of rich countries as a 
result of trade and foreign direct investment growth, and in poor countries foreign 
corporations often have among the highest environmental and labor standards (Bhagwati 
and Hudec 1996). Nor has trade growth been a major contributor to the stagnation of 
wages of unskilled workers in OECD countries (Greenaway and Nelson 2002).  
The number of such claims by anti-globalization groups – almost invariably not 
supported by credible empirical evidence – makes it a huge task to address them all 
systematically. However, some attention is given in Section 4.3 below to the social and 
environmental benefits and costs associated with cutting subsidies and trade barriers, with 






3.  The opportunities for reducing subsidies and trade barriers 
 
 
The gains from reducing government interventions in markets have been well 
known since the writing of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations more than two centuries 
ago, and popular magazines such as The Economist and more and more daily newspapers 
continue to remind the public of the virtues of market opening.
8 Even so, greater 
dissemination of empirical information on the net economic benefits of reducing trade 
distortions, to balance the often-exaggerated claims by potential losers and their 
supporters of the adjustment costs of reform, can no doubt assist the liberalization 
process. Empirical studies can also shed better light and take some of the heat out of 
debates about whether, in the presence of domestic distortions such as undertaxed 
pollution, subsidy and trade reform is welfare-reducing. Such studies can also point to the 
domestic policy reforms that should accompany trade reform so as to guarantee not only 
national welfare improvement in aggregate but also that there is no significant left-behind 
group, no unexpected new damage to the environment, etc. Clearly there is an 
opportunity for well-meaning interest groups, think tanks and national and international 
economic agencies to spend more money and resources on such empirical studies, and in 
particular on the effective dissemination of their findings. In an idealistic world in which 
such studies were able to persuade all governments to fully liberalize their trade 
unilaterally, the benefit derived from that opportunity would be measured by the gain 
from moving the world to one free of subsidies and trade barriers (Opportunity 1). 
Unlikely though such an outcome may seem in the foreseeable future, it provides a 
benchmark against which all other opportunities to partially meet this challenge can be 
measured. 
Among the more-feasible opportunities available today for encouraging trade 
negotiations to stimulate significant market opening, the most obvious is a non-
preferential legally binding partial trade liberalization following the WTO’s current round 
of multilateral trade negotiations (Opportunity 2). That round was launched in Doha, the 
capital of Qatar, in 2001 with the intention of completing negotiations at the end of 2004, 
when implementation of the last of the Uruguay Round commitments under WTO are 
scheduled to be completed. It now seems uncertain as to how long the current round will 
take, what issues will be kept on its agenda, and indeed even whether it will come to a 
successful conclusion. That uncertainty is all the more reason for assessing the potential 
of this opportunity, given that it involves almost 150 WTO member countries plus 
another 25 in the midst of accession, and hence all but a tiny fraction of global trade. 
There are at least three other types of trade negotiating opportunities that, while 
they involve only a subset of the world’s economies, have the potential to generate 
deeper integration in the medium term and so are worth comparing to the WTO Doha 
round. One is non-preferential but non-binding trade liberalization, as currently being 
pursued by the Pacific rim members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum. APEC member countries agreed in 1994, and have since reiterated that 
commitment several times, to move to free trade in the Asia Pacific region by 2010 in the 
                                                 
8 On the intellectual history of the virtues of free trade, see Bhagwati (1988, Ch. 2) and Irwin (1996). 
Bhagwati notes that the virtues of division of labour and exchange were cited twenty four centuries ago in 





case of developed countries and 2020 in the case of developing countries. Even though 
there is no legal binding on members to achieve that goal and retain that status beyond 
the deadline, the distinguishing feature of this long-term commitment is that, as with 
WTO commitments, the market opening is to be provided to all trading partners of each 
APEC country (a most-favored-nation or MFN reform) and not just to other APEC 
members as in a free trade agreement (FTA). That makes its effects simply a subset of 
those derived from moving to global free trade, so the APEC initiative can be considered 
as part of Opportunity 1. 
A second type of trade negotiating opportunity involving a subset of the world’s 
economies is a reciprocal preferential agreement. This could take the form of an FTA, a 
customs union, or a broader economic union. Typically such an agreement would be 
legally binding and, even though it would be notified to the WTO, it would provide 
greater market access only to signatories to that agreement and hence would not be MFN. 
An example is the agreed enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 25 members, 
which is to be implemented from May 2004. Even though implementation will be spread 
over the next few years, for present purposes enlarging the EU to 25 is considered an 
opportunity already seized rather than in prospect (and further eastern enlargement is 
unlikely before the next decade). Efforts are also being made to negotiate a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA), which potentially would bring together all the economies 
of North, Central and South America. This is by far the largest and most ambitious 
preferential agreement currently in prospect: it dwarfs the bilateral FTA negotiations the 
US and EU are having with a range of other countries, and it is also more advanced than 
other proposed FTAs such as in South Asia and between China and Southeast Asia. 
Hence the FTAA provides an upper limit on the gains that might be expected from this 
type of trade agreement (Opportunity 3). 
There is also the opportunity to enter into non-reciprocal preferential trade 
agreements, as the EU has with its former colonies (the so-called ACP countries of 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific) and as most OECD countries have with developing 
countries in the form of a Generalized System of tariff Preferences (GSP). The EU’s 
recent initiative to extend preferences for UN-designated ‘least developed countries’ 
(LDCs) provides duty- and quota-free access to the EU for exports of ‘everything but 
arms’ (EBA). It received in-principle, best-endeavors endorsement by other OECD 
countries at the WTO Ministerial in Doha in November 2001, but without any specific 
timetable. While this opportunity (Opportunity 4) clearly involves only a small volume 
of global trade, it has a relatively high probability of being implemented unilaterally by 
numerous countries and is perceived to be of direct benefit to the world’s poorest people 





4.  Benefits and costs of reducing subsidies and trade barriers  
 
 
To estimate the benefits and costs associated with the opportunities just outlined, 
this section first looks at economic benefits, particularly for halving subsidies and trade 
barriers by 2010. That is a rather optimistic scenario for the Doha round (Opportunity 2), 
but one that is not politically infeasible if enough resources were to be expended globally 
to alter the balance of power between narrow pro-protection private interest groups and 
broader community interests in free trade. The economic costs associated with that 
strategy are then examined, followed by an assessment of its social and environmental 
benefits and costs, before concluding as to the overall net present value and benefit/cost 
ratio for society from reducing subsidies and trade barriers. 
 
4.1 Economic benefits from opportunities to reduce subsidies and trade barriers 
 
4.1.1 The computable general equilibrium approach to measuring economic benefits  
 
All the estimates considered below of the potential global economic welfare gains 
from these opportunities are generated using computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models of the global economy, the most common of which (GTAP) is described in the 
Appendix. The CGE welfare gains refer to the equivalent variation in income (EV) as a 
result of each of the shocks described.
9 While not without their shortcomings (see 
Francois 2000, Whalley 2000, Anderson 2003 and the list of caveats in Section 4.1.7), 
CGE models are far superior for current purposes to partial equilibrium models, which 
fail to capture the economy-wide nature of the adjustments to reform whereby some 
sectors expand when others contract and release capital and labor; and they are also 
superior to macroeconometric models which typically lack sufficient sectoral detail 
(Francois and Reinert 1997). They were first used in multilateral trade reform analysis in 
ex post assessments of the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations in the late 1970s/early 
1980s (Cline et al. 1978; Deardorff and Stern 1979, 1986; Whalley 1985). Since then 
they have been used increasingly during and following the Uruguay Round, as shown, for 
example, in the various studies summarized in Martin and Winters (1996). 
Empirical comparative static studies of the economic welfare gains from trade 
liberalization typically generate positive gains for the world and for most participating 
countries. (Exceptions are when a country’s welfare is reduced more by a terms of trade 
change or reduced rents from preferential market access quotas than it is boosted by 
improvements due to reallocating its resources away from protected industries.) When 
economies of scale and monopolistic competition (IRS/MC) are assumed instead of 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition (CRS/PC), and when trade in not just 
goods but also services is liberalized, the estimates of potential gains can be increased 
several fold. A few economists have also examined the effects of lowering barriers to 
international capital flows or labor movements, and some have included estimates of a 
lowering of trade costs as a result of trade facilitation measures such as streamlining 
                                                 
9 EV is defined as the income that consumers would be willing to forego and still have the same level of 
well-being after as before the reform. For a discussion of the merits of EV versus other measures of change 





customs-clearance procedures. Even so, in most studies the sum of these comparative 
static CGE model estimates tends to amount to only a tiny fraction of GDP. 
Those low estimated gains seem to fly in the face of casual empiricism. Irwin 
(2002), for example, notes that three different countries on three continents chose to 
liberalize in three different decades, and per capita GDP growth in each of those 
countries accelerated markedly thereafter (Korea from 1965, Chile from 1974 and India 
from 1991 – see Irwin 2002, Figures 2.3 to 2.5). Admittedly those historical liberalization 
experiences involved also complementary reforms to other domestic policies and 
institutions that would have contributed significantly to the observed boosts in economic 
growth. Even so, as mentioned in Section 2.2 above, both theoretical economists and 
econometricians have sought to demonstrate that trade can promote not only static 
efficiency gains but also dynamic gains. Some CGE modelers have tried to proxy that 
effect by adding an additional one-off total factor productivity shock to their trade reform 
scenarios. But reform may also raise the rate of factor productivity growth and/or of 
capital accumulation. Such endogenous growth has yet to be satisfactorily introduced into 
CGE models,
10 and in any case it is unclear how to interpret a model’s estimated welfare 
effects if households are reducing current consumption in order to boost their or their 
descendents’ future consumption by investing more. 
It should be kept in mind that all the experiments in the comparative static CGE 
studies surveyed below reduce only trade barriers plus agricultural production and export 
subsidies. The reasons for including subsidies only in agriculture are that they are the key 
subsidies explicitly being negotiated at the WTO (where non-agricultural export subsidies 
are illegal),
11 they represented an estimated 38 percent of all government expenditure on 
subsidies globally during 1994-98,
12 and they are fully represented in the GTAP database 
whereas subsidies for most other sectors are not included so it is not possible to estimate 
their welfare cost within the same framework. And the reason for not also explicitly 
estimating the welfare impacts of other domestic policies and institutions that, because of 
their complementarity, affect the payoff from opening up is that typically they are beyond 
the sphere of influence of international trade negotiators.  
With this as background, consider first the economic benefits associated with each 
of the four opportunities in turn.  
 
4.1.2 Removing all trade barriers and agricultural subsidies globally  
 
Only a few CGE modeling studies have reported simulations of complete 
liberalization of trade. The ones of most relevance are those that incorporate in their 
                                                 
10 For an early attempt to develop a dynamic version of the GTAP model, see Ianchovichina and 
McDougall (2000).  
11 Production subsidies in non-agricultural sectors, however, have come under close scrutiny through the 
WTO’s dispute settlement procedures since the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures came into force with the WTO’s formation in 1995 (Bagwell and Staiger 2004). 
Also, fisheries subsidies are explicitly under consideration by negotiators in the WTO’s Doha round. 
12 See van Beers and de Moor (2001, Table 3.1), whose estimates suggest energy subsidies are the next 
biggest group, at 22 percent of all subsidies, followed closely by road transport (21 percent) and then water 
(6 percent), forestry and mining (each 3 percent) and fisheries (2 percent), with manufacturing subsidies 
making up the residual 5 percent. For more details on energy and transport subsidies, see OECD (1997) and 





baseline the implementation of all the Uruguay Round agreements, since that process is 
due for completion at the end of 2004. The results are reported in Table 1 and each study 
is discussed in turn. 
The ADFHHM study (Anderson et al. 2002) provides the simplest scenario: 
global liberalization of just merchandise trade using a comparative static version of the 
GTAP model with constant returns to scale and perfect competition in all product and 
factor markets (first described in Hertel 1997). The GTAP Version 4 database 
(McDougall, Elberhnri and Truong 1998), which provides data for 1995, is used in that 
study to generate a new baseline for 2005 by projecting the world economy forward a 
decade and assuming all Uruguay Round commitments (including the politically sensitive 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing) and those of China and Taiwan (made on their 
accession to the WTO) are implemented by then. This baseline for 2005 is then compared 
with how it would look after full adjustment following the removal of all countries’ trade 
barriers and agricultural subsidies. The economic welfare gain is estimated to be US$254 
billion per year in 1995 dollars as of 2005 (and hence slightly more each year thereafter 
as the global economy expands). Of that, $108 billion p.a. is estimated to accrue to 
developing countries. These are the lowest of the estimates summarized in Table 1. Using 
the decomposition algorithm developed by Harrison, Horridge and Pearson (2000), Table 
2 shows that only two-fifths of this study’s estimated gain to developing countries are 
derived from policy changes in developed countries. Changes in policies in developing 
countries make a more substantial contribution to other developing countries' economic 
welfare, and almost half of that gain comes from policy changes in their agricultural 
sector. This reflects the importance not only of own-country reform but also of expanding 
South-South trade. 
The BDS study (Brown, Deardorff and Stern 2003) uses the same Version 4 
GTAP data base also projected to 2005, but they embed it in their static Michigan Model 
of World Production and Trade (www.ssp.umich.edu/rsie/model and Deardorff and Stern 
1986) to produce the highest of the surveyed estimates of global welfare gains from 
complete removal of trade barriers and agricultural subsidies: $2080 billion p.a., of which 
$431 billion would accrue to developing countries. These much larger estimates are the 
result of several features of this study: not having China and Taiwan’s implementation of 
their WTO accession commitments in the baseline; the inclusion of increasing returns to 
scale and monopolistic competition (IRS/MC) for non-agricultural sectors and therefore 
product heterogeneity at the level of the firm rather than just the national industry; 
liberalization of services in addition to goods trade (with IRS/MC assumed for the huge 
services sector); and the inclusion in services liberalization of the opening to foreign 
direct investment. The latter boosts substantially the gains from services liberalization, 
which account for 63 percent or $1310 of this study’s estimated total gains. 
All other estimates of the gains from complete trade liberalization are between 
these two extremes. The FMT study (Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren 2003), which 
builds on Francois (2001), uses the more-recent Version 5.2 of the GTAP database for 
1997 (Dimaranan and McDougall 2002) and a variant of the GTAP model to include 
IRS/MC (see www.intereconomics.com/francois and Francois 1998). As in the BDS 





are emphasized in the new economic geography literature.
13 Its economic welfare gain is 
estimated to be US$367 billion per year in 1997 dollars as of 1997, of which $113 billion 
p.a. is estimated to accrue to developing countries. Just over 40 percent of that total ($151 
billion) is due to trade facilitation measures such as streamlining customs clearance,
14 
while only 14 percent ($53 billion) is due to services trade reform. The global gains from 
removing just merchandise trade barriers is $163 billion in 1997 (compared with 
ADFHHM’s gain of $254 billion for 2005 when the global economy is considerably 
larger). Part of the reason for these gains being lower than those from the BDS study is 
that this one includes in its baseline China’s WTO accession, the European Union’s 
Agenda 2000 and the EU’s eastern enlargement, which lowers its estimate of the gains 
from removing residual EU-25 trade barriers. But the main reason has to do with the 
quite different way in which services trade barriers are measured and their reform 
modeled. 
The final study reported in Table 1, WBGEP (World Bank 2002), uses the same 
1997 GTAP data base as FMT but projects the GTAP model to 2015. With the world 
economy considerably bigger then than in 1997 or 2005 one would expect WBGEP to 
provide larger dollar estimates, other things equal. Two are provided, both assuming 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition and both with only merchandise trade 
reformed. The first estimate, which is comparable to the ADFHHM study, provides a 
global gain of $355 billion p.a. for 2015. That is in line with ADFHHM’s estimate of 
$254 billion for 2005 as both represent 0.7 percent of GDP for their respective years, as 
projected by the World Bank (2003, Table A3.1). The slightly larger share of that gain 
going to developing countries (52 percent in 2015 compared with ADFHHM’s 43 
percent) also is in line with the expected growth in developing countries’ share of the 
world economy over that decade.  
The second WBGEP estimate assumes liberalization boosts factor productivity in 
each industry according to the extent of growth in the share of production exported by the 
industry. While the precise formula used for this adjustment is somewhat arbitrary, it 
nonetheless gives a feel for how the overall size and composition across economies of the 
gains from trade can change when allowance is made for an openness-induced 
productivity boost. The case presented suggests the gains would rise 2.3 times to $832 
billion p.a. with that adjustment,
15 and since trade of developing countries grows more 
than that of OECD countries under full liberalization, they receive 65 percent of those 
gains ($539 billion) instead of the 52 percent or $184 billion generated without that 
productivity adjustment. 
                                                 
13 See, for example, Fujita, Krugman and Venables (2001), Neary (2001), Fujita and Thisse (2002) and 
Baldwin et al. (2003). 
14 The OECD defines trade facilitation as the simplification and standardization of procedures and 
associated information flows required to move products internationally from seller to buyer and to pass 
payment in the other direction. For an in-depth discussion of the nature and importance of reducing trading 
costs, see World Bank (2003, Ch. 6). Francois et al. (2003) assume full trade liberalization would be 
accompanied by a reduction in trading costs (the difference between fob and cif valuations) of 3 percent of 
the value of trade.  
15 This greater gain is consistent with the consensus that has developed over the past decade that 
incorporating endogenous growth effects in CGE models raises the welfare gains from trade liberalization 
by several orders of magnitude. A recent study by Rutherford and Tarr (2002), using a generic model of a 





In both WBGEP simulations, agriculture contributes 70 percent of the gains from 
liberalizing all merchandise trade. This is very similar to the estimate of two-thirds by 
both the ADFHHM and FMT studies.
16 The extent to which these results are dominated 
by agriculture is remarkable, given that agriculture is responsible for only one-twelfth of 
global GDP and exports. It simply reflects the fact that agricultural sectors of both rich 
and poor countries are still highly protected from import competition, and in some rich 
countries are also subsidized directly, despite the efforts of the Uruguay Round. 
By contrast to the similarity in welfare results for goods trade liberalization, the 
gain from services trade reform reported in the FMT study ($53 billion in 1997) is only a 
small fraction of the BDS estimate of $1280 billion in 2005 ($220 billion of which goes 
to developing countries). The FMT estimate is in line with an estimate by Verikios and 
Zhang (2001) of $47 billion globally just for telecom and financial services, while the 
BDS estimate of $220 billion for developing countries alone is exceeded by the WBGEP 
study which also reports an estimate of the gain from liberalizing services trade just for 
developing countries, of $884 billion in 2015. These vastly different results for services 
reflect the great deal of uncertainty that still prevails in estimating the extent and effects 
of services trade barriers (see Findlay and Warren 2001; Whalley 2003). Even though this 
is widely recognized as a major area of trade policy concern for both developed and 
developing countries, there is clearly much more research required in this area before we 
can expect a convergence of empirical estimates for the services sector. 
The huge estimate for gains from services reform in the BDS study appears to be 
a consequence of their model explicitly allowing for foreign investment flows, in contrast 
to the standard GTAP model where such flows play a very modest role. What this 
highlights is that trade in products need not – as suggested by the simplest of trade 
models (Mundell 1957) – be a complete substitute for trade in factors of production such 
as capital and labor. Indeed, as Markusen (1983) has shown (and see also Ethier 1996), 
factor trade can be a complement to product trade. Nor are we able to say a priori which 
might grow more when trade in all factors and products is opened simultaneously 
(Michaely 2003).  
None of the above empirical studies examines the global welfare gains from 
allowing greater international movement of labor. Historical analyses of global migration 
by Hatton and Williamson (1998, 2002) conclude that the effective demand by 
developing country workers to move to higher-income countries is likely to grow 
considerably over the next quarter century, with wage differentials a major driving force. 
It appears national governments, however, are becoming more rather than less restrictive 
of migrant inflows in the wake of that growing demand. How costly are such restrictions? 
A CGE study twenty years ago suggested complete liberalization of world labor markets, 
in the presence of existing barriers to trade in products and capital, could double world 
income and in so doing raise several-fold the economic welfare of people working at that 
time in developing countries (Hamilton and Whalley 1984). The more-recent resurgence 
                                                 
16 By contrast, BDS estimate a share close to zero. The explanation BDS provide for this result is that the 
expanding of agriculture in lightly protecting countries draws resources from the non-agricultural sectors 
which, unlike agriculture, are assumed to have increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. 
Apparently that IRS/MC feature is having a much stronger effect in the BDS model than it is in the FMT 
one (which also has IRS/MC), since the FMT estimated contribution of agriculture is close to the estimates 





of interest in this subject has encouraged one group of GTAP modelers to examine this 
issue afresh, but in the context of Mode 4 of the WTO’s General Agreements on Trade in 
Services, the so-called temporary movement of natural persons. Winters et al. (2003) 
simulate the effect of raising worker immigration quotas of developed countries enough 
to increase labor forces there by 3 percent (which sums to a temporary migration flow 
from developing countries of 8.4 million unskilled and 8 million skilled workers or just 
0.6 percent of the labor force in developing countries). A movement even as modest as 
that is estimated to raise annual world welfare by $156 billion (0.6 percent of global 
income), with most of that benefit accruing to those currently in developing countries 
who migrate. These welfare results underscore two points: first, migration restrictions are 
very costly to people in poor countries; and second, if rich countries are to persist with 
those restrictions in the wake of growing demands for lifting them, even more effort 
should be made to alleviate poverty through liberalizing international capital flows and 
trade in products exportable from developing countries, most notably agricultural goods. 
The above studies do not provide an estimate of the net welfare gains from 
reducing direct government subsidies to domestic production or consumption of non-farm 
products. They would be small compared with those from trade reform, bearing in mind 
that an estimated 38 percent of all government subsidies go to agriculture (van Beers and 
de Moor 2001) and hence are captured in the above estimates. They nonetheless represent 
significant transfers from taxpayers to special interest groups, estimated by van Beers and 
de Moor (2001, Table 3.1) to be $1065 billion per year globally between 1994 and 1998 
(4 percent of GDP) and by others to be between half and twice that amount. Cutting those 
subsidies therefore has the potential to provide a great deal of revenue for meeting 
society’s other pressing challenges. 
 
4.1.3 Reducing trade barriers and agricultural subsidies following the WTO’s Doha 
round 
 
  The WTO is in the midst of its first round of multilateral trade negotiations 
following the Uruguay Round, whose implementation program is scheduled to be 
completed at the end of 2004. The present round, known as the Doha Development 
Agenda, is currently at an early stage, and even the list of issues to be negotiated is yet to 
be finalized, even though the round was originally scheduled to conclude at the end of 
2004 presumably with implementation to begin in 2006 following ratification by national 
governments in 2005. Given the slow progress to date, assessing the likely benefits is 
therefore difficult, even though we know the potential benefits are those associated with 
full trade liberalization as discussed above.  
Typically ex ante analyses by CGE modelers in this situation involve uniform 
across-the-board tariff cuts. The above-mentioned BDS study (Brown, Deardorff and 
Stern 2003), for example, reports a one-third cut in applied rates of protection and, 
because their model is linear, the results are simply one-third of those reported above. If 
their tariff cuts were 50 percent, they would generate a global welfare gain of $1030 
billion p.a. of which $216 billion would accrue to developing countries. This is again 
hugely greater than what other analysts are reporting (Table 3).  
For example, the FMT study reports a 50 percent across-the-board cut to tariffs 





modeled for their full global liberalization reported above. The authors estimate a global 
welfare gain from that 50 percent reform of just $196 billion per year, which is slightly 
over half their estimate for full liberalization although the component parts differ (e.g., 
the gain to developing countries would be 44 percent of that total, compared with only 31 
percent of the gains from full reform). An important reason for this non-linearity is that 
FMT cut bound tariffs on merchandise by 50 percent, not the (often much lower) applied 
rates that typically are used by modelers including BDS. Since it is the rates that are 
bound in WTO commitments that are negotiated, this feature of FMT’s study is more 
realistic. Of that $196 billion, only 4 percent is due to the halving of domestic subsidies 
to agriculture.
17  
The FMT’s global welfare gain is very similar to that estimated for a 50 percent 
across-the-board cut to tariffs and farm export subsidies by Harrison, Rutherford, Tarr 
and Gurgel (HRTG 2003). That is pure coincidence though, as there are some features of 
the HRTG study that would lead one to expect larger estimates (they use higher price 
elasticities than most other trade modelers, and cut applied rather than bound tariffs), and 
other features that would lower their estimates (they assume constant returns to scale, do 
not liberalize services trade or domestic farm subsidies, and there is no trade facilitation 
included).  
On the one hand, all three of these studies are probably excessive in the sense that 
no previous multilateral trade reform has agreed to anywhere near as much as a 50 
percent across-the-board cut in (especially applied) rates.
18 On the other hand, these 
studies all underestimate the potential gains, perhaps by a wide margin, because they 
exclude any endogenous growth effects and effects of liberalization of trade in labor or 
capital (with the exception of the BDS study where FDI in services is allowed). 
 
4.1.4 Removing intra-American trade barriers following the FTAA negotiations 
 
  The negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) – the 
largest such FTA negotiations currently under way or in prospect – have begun but are 
running into political problems so it is not clear if/when they might conclude. The reason 
for considering this opportunity here is simply to point out that the potential global gains 
from such an FTA are only a small fraction of those obtainable from multilateral 
negotiation (because the major economies of Europe and North America are already well 
integrated and so any new initiatives involve relatively small economies joining one of 
those hubs or integrating among themselves). Two studies that examine both Doha and 
the FTAA are reported in Table 3, together with one, by Hertel, Hummels, Ivanic, and 
Keeney (HHIK 2003), that looks just at the FTAA. The global gain from the FTAA in the 
                                                 
17 That represents 15 percent of the gains from the agricultural portion of the reform. This is consistent with 
other studies which also find domestic support measures are a relatively minor part of agricultural 
assistance measures. See, for example, Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2004) and Rae and Strutt (2003). 
Those findings vindicate the present paper’s focus on border measures.  
18 Francois (2001) compares gains from a 50 percent cut in bound tariffs with a 50 percent cut in applied 
tariffs and finds the global gains from the former to be one-sixth less than from the latter. A complete 
elimination of agricultural export subsidies is conceivable, as could be true too for developed countries’ 
tariffs on manufactures other than for textiles and clothing; but a halving of applied agricultural tariffs in 
this first WTO round seems unlikely, especially given the considerable extent to which bound tariffs 





BDS study is estimated to be just one-twelfth of that from a 50 percent multilateral trade 
liberalization (hence one-sixth that from a 25 percent multilateral reform, etc.); and for 
the HRTG study the difference is even greater. Furthermore, these studies take no 
account of the dampening effect of the rules of origin that almost invariably constrain the 
extent to which firms can take advantage of any FTA’s removal of bilateral tariffs 
(Krueger 1999; Anson et al 2003); nor of the fact that such FTAs typically have phase-in 
periods that stretch more than a decade for some products and exclude altogether the 
most sensitive products.  
FTAs of this type are pursued nonetheless for a wide range of reasons, including 
preferential access to an important protected market (often at the expense of other 
countries), insurance against anti-dumping by that partner, and deeper and faster 
integration than has been possible or is in prospect through the multilateral reform route 
(Schiff and Winters 2003). The gains to just one or a few developing economies from 
joining with North America or the EU may be non-trivial, but so too would be the gains 
from a similar degree of multilateral reform. According to the HRTG study, a multilateral 
reform involving even just a 25 percent reduction in merchandise tariffs would benefit 
South America more than the FTAA, for example.  
  Moreover, even leaving aside the potential systemic cost of FTAs on the WTO 
rules-based multilateral trading system, such preferential agreements can harm excluded 
developing and/or developed countries through trade diversion. For example, the 
estimated gains to FTAA members are nearly fully offset by losses to excluded 
economies, according to the HHIK and HRTG studies. Harmful trade diversion would 
also result from an FTA between, say, South Asia and either North America or the EU, 
according to GTAP results reported in Bandara and Yu (2003). Indeed a recent 
examination of 18 existing preferential trading arrangements found that 12 diverted more 
merchandise trade from non-members than they created among members (Adams et al. 
2003). That review was able to conclude more positively about the benefits of FTAs in 
reforming such things as investment, services, competition policy and government 
procurement, but was unable to say whether those benefits tend to be sufficient to offset 
any losses from trade diversion. Another recent review, by Nielsen (2003), came to 
similar conclusions, and added that the greatest gains for developing countries from 
FTAs would come if developed countries were to liberalize trade in their politically 
sensitive sectors, most notably agriculture but also textiles and clothing. That is likely in 
preferential agreements only with the smallest of developing countries whose impact on 
protective developed economies is tiny – examples of which are examined in the next 
sub-section. 
 
4.1.5 Removing developed country barriers to exports from least-developed countries 
 
  The EU’s recent initiative to extend preferences for United Nations-designated 
‘least developed countries’ (LDCs) provides duty-and quota-free access to the EU for 
exports of ‘everything but arms’ (EBA). That initiative received in-principle, best-
endeavors endorsement at the WTO Ministerial in Doha in November 2001, but without 
any specific timetable. Liberal though that proposal sounds, note that it does not include 
trade in services (of which the most important for LDCs would be movement of natural 





high-wage countries – see Winters et al. 2003). Also, a number of safeguard provisions 
are included in addition to the EU’s normal anti-dumping measures. Furthermore, access 
to three politically sensitive agricultural markets, bananas, rice and sugar, would be 
phased in by the EU only gradually over the rest of this decade (and would be subject to 
stricter safeguards).  
Several empirical studies of the proposal have already appeared. A World Bank 
study by Ianchovichina, Mattoo and Olarreaga (2001) compares the EU proposal, from 
the viewpoint of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with recent initiatives of the United States 
and Japan. Its GTAP modeling results suggest that even the most generous interpretation 
of the United States’ Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (which they model as 
unrestricted access to the US for all SSA exports) would benefit SSA very little because 
the US economy is already very open and, in the products where it is not (e.g. textiles and 
clothing), SSA countries have little comparative advantage. By contrast, the EU proposal, 
especially if it were to apply to all Quad countries (the EU, the US, Canada and Japan), 
would have a sizeable effect on SSA trade and welfare – provided agriculture is included 
in the deal. Just from EU access alone, SSA exports would be raised by more than 
US$0.5 billion and SSA economic welfare would increase by $0.3 billion per year (a 0.2 
percent boost).
19 The results overstate the benefits of the EU proposal, however, as this 
World Bank study assumes all SSA countries (excluding relatively wealthy South Africa 
and Mauritius), not just the LDCs amongst them, would get duty- and quota-free access. 
Another World Bank study, by Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2002), uses a partial 
equilibrium approach and looks at the benefit of the EU initiative for LCDs not just in 
SSA but globally. It finds that trade of LDCs would increase by US$2.5 billion per year if 
all Quad countries provided LDCs with duty- and quota-free access on all merchandise.
20 
However, almost half of that increase would come as a result of trade diversion from 
other developing countries. The authors suggest this is trivial because it represents less 
than 0.1 percent of other developing countries’ exports (about $1.1 billion).
21 But if the 
48 LDCs are given such preferences, they will become advocates for rather than against 
the continuation of MFN tariff peaks for agriculture and textiles – diminishing 
considerably the number of WTO members negotiating for their reduction. It may be true 
that MFN reductions in agricultural and textile tariffs would help LDCs much less than it 
would help other developing countries, as the study by Hoekman et al. (2002) finds; but 
the gains to consumers in the QUAD would be more than sufficient to allow them to 
increase their aid to LDCs to compensate many times over for the loss of LDC income 
from the preference erosion that necessarily accompanies MFN reform.  
 
                                                 
19 This is very similar to the estimate by UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Ch. 3). 
20 This and other estimates of gains from preferential market access provisions need to be discounted to the 
extent that such things as rules of origin, anti-dumping duties, and sanitary, phytosanitary and other 
technical barriers limit the actual trade allowed. For a detailed analysis of these types of restrictions on EU 
imports from Bangladesh in recent years, see UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Ch. 5). 
21 The impact outside the LDC group would be far from trivial for Mauritius, however, since the vast bulk 
of its exports are quota-restricted sales of clothing and sugar to the EU and US. See the discussion in 





4.1.6 How best to reduce subsidies and trade barriers globally by 2010? 
 
To open markets in the face of the political economy pressures for retaining 
subsidies and trade barriers requires seizing on not just one of the above-mentioned four 
opportunities but rather adopting a multi-pronged approach. That approach would seek to 
achieve unilateral reform at the national level and multilateral reform at the WTO level, 
supplemented by regional support for both as adopted by APEC members in what its 
supporters call open (that is, MFN) regionalism. Exploiting this set of opportunities 
requires developing stronger lobbies for freer MFN trade and investment, to counter the 
lobbying of entrenched protectionist forces. That in turn requires sponsoring policy think 
tanks and other suppliers of international trade policy analysis and advocacy, so that the 
vast majority of the community who would gain from freer trade are made more aware of 
the inefficiencies and inequities associated with subsidies and trade restrictions. Just one 
or two billion dollars per year over the next five years could go a long way in altering the 
climate of public opinion on this issue. The aim would be to encourage national 
governments to engage not only in unilateral reform but also to embrace the opportunity 
to negotiate an ambitious outcome from the WTO’s current Doha Development round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. The latter is important because if other countries also 
agree to liberalize, that makes it easier for any one government to persuade its 
constituency to liberalize too; and if it is done within the WTO framework, those 
commitments will be MFN and they will be legally bound so that backsliding in the 
future becomes much less of an option. With the forces of globalization encouraging 
good (and penalizing bad) economic governance more than ever before, an ambitious 
target is appropriate. For the rest of this paper, the target is assumed to be a 50 percent 
reduction in subsidies and trade barriers as bound in the WTO (hence a smaller reduction 
in applied tariff rates, particularly for developing countries given the large degree of 
‘binding overhang’ in their current WTO tariff commitments – see Francois and Martin 
2003).
22 
Preferential trade agreements would not be included in this approach, even though 
they will no doubt continue to be pursued in the years ahead. Non-reciprocal trade 
preference agreements in particular are of questionable value, for at least five reasons 
which apply to the ‘everything but arms’ initiative discussed above and equally to the 
agreement the EU has had with its former colonies known collectively as ACP (Asia, 
Caribbean and Pacific) developing countries. First, many other equally poor but non-
LDC/non-ACP developing countries (e.g., Vietnam) are harmed by such preferences. 
This was made abundantly clear in the 1990s during the infamous dispute-settlement case 
that was brought to the WTO concerning the EU’s banana import regime. One 
background study showed that for every dollar of benefit that the banana policy brought 
to producers in ACP countries, the regime harmed non-ACP developing country 
                                                 
22 This 50 percent across-the-board cut is in between two other possibilities: an ambitious Swiss formula 
which would cut higher tariffs by a larger percentage, and a conservative approach which at the extreme 
would exclude tariff peaks (as was effectively done in earlier GATT rounds in which agricultural and 
textile protection was not lowered). A study by Fontagné, Guérin and Jean (2004) uses a new and very 
detailed tariff data set to compare these three possible modalities. They find that the conservative approach 
(excluding cuts to tariff equivalents in excess of 15 percent for manufacturing and of 85 percent for 
agriculture) generates only half the welfare gains of the across-the-board approach, while the Swiss formula 





producers by almost exactly one dollar – and in the process harmed EU consumers by 
more than thirteen dollars (Borrell 1999a). It is difficult to imagine a more inefficient 
way of transferring welfare to poor countries, since EU citizens could have been, through 
official development assistance payments, 13 times as effective in helping ACP banana 
producers and not hurt non-ACP banana producers at all.
23 Such wasteful trade diversion 
is avoided under non-discriminatory, MFN liberalizations that result from multilateral 
trade negotiations under WTO. 
Second, the additional production that is encouraged in those LDCs or ACP 
countries getting privileged access to the high-priced EU market is not internationally 
competitive at current prices (otherwise it would have been produced prior to getting that 
preferential treatment). Indeed the industry as a whole may not have existed in the 
LDC/ACP country had the preference scheme not been introduced.
24 In that case, its 
profits are likely to be lean despite the scheme, and would disappear if and when the 
scheme is dismantled or EU MFN tariffs are reduced. Efforts to learn the skills needed, 
and the sunk capital invested in that industry rather than in ones in which the country has 
a natural comparative advantage, would then earn no further rewards. 
Third, these preference schemes reduce very substantially the capacity for 
developing countries as a group to press for more access to developed country markets. 
Perhaps if such preferences had not been offered in the first place, developing countries 
would have negotiated much more vigorously in previous GATT rounds for lower tariffs 
on agricultural and other imports to developed countries.  
Fourth, because these preferential access schemes are not reciprocal agreements 
(that is, the developing countries are not required to open their markets to developed 
countries’ exports) they contribute nothing to the removal of the wasteful trade-restrictive 
policies of the LDC/ACP countries. This contrasts with market access negotiations under 
WTO, which are characterized by reciprocity.  
Points one through three also apply to South-North reciprocal FTAs. Furthermore, 
the latter agreements are rarely just a simple sentence such as: there shall be free trade 
between the parties. On the contrary, they can run to thousands of pages involving long 
lists of exceptions, complex rules of origin and dispute settlement procedures, differing 
phase-in periods for different products, safeguard mechanisms, requirements to meet the 
trade partner’s myriad standards, and so on. So complex are such features that it is not 
uncommon for firms to pay the MFN tariff rather than do all the paperwork necessary to 
get duty-free access within an FTA. And while they are potentially able to deliver gains 
to those who join them, FTAs do so to some extent at the expense of excluded countries 
and so, as was clear from the discussion in Section 4.1.4 above of the FTAA studies, they 
contribute only a small fraction of the gains that can come from WTO-based multilateral 
reform – and yet they can involve a major diversion of trade negotiator attention away 
from WTO negotiations. In any case, the more MFN tariffs are reduced the less need 
there is for preferential trade agreements. 
                                                 
23 The EU is contemplating moving by 2006 to a tariff-only regime for banana imports from non-ACP 
countries, and in the process raising its tariff from the current 75 Euros. That could raise the protective 
effect of the tariff for ACP countries currently enjoying duty-free access, so yet again harming other 
developing countries (Borrell and Bauer 2004). 
24Alternatively, the ACP scheme may have caused an existing industry to become less competitive. An 
extreme example of an industry that has ossified as a consequence of regulations introduced to share the 







4.1.7 Summary of gross economic benefits from reducing subsidies and trade barriers by 
2010 
 
What can be concluded from the range of estimates in Table 3 of the gross 
economic benefits that would flow to developing countries and to the global economy as 
a whole from a halving of subsidies and trade barriers if that was agreed in 2004-05 and 
was phased in equally over five years from 2006? Some people will claim some of those 
estimates are too high for reasons that include the following: 
•  modelers should be cutting not applied but bound tariffs (as in the FMT study); 
•  increasing returns to scale should already have been exploited by producers so 
those modelers assuming IRS are exaggerating the gains from reform; 
•  the gains to developing countries enjoying tariff preferences in developed country 
markets are exaggerated if (as is the case) those preferential rates are not included 
in the models’ tariff profiles;
25 
•  domestic distortionary policies and exchange rate policies, which can inhibit the 
benefits of opening up, are not all included in the models;  
•  existing but currently redundant technical barriers might cease to be redundant 
and become binding constraints to trade as tariffs fall, in which case the rate of 
protection would fall less than the applied tariff rate; and 
•  re-instrumentation of assistance to industries will reduce the gains and may even 
turn them into losses if sufficiently inferior policy instruments (e.g., new technical 
barriers to trade) replace the ones being liberalized. 
On the other hand, there are numerous reasons for believing some of the estimates in 
Table 3 may be too low, including the following: 
•  services as well as goods trade reforms need to be factored into the calculation, 
together with trade facilitation and FDI liberalization if not also international 
migration; 
•  the opening up of government procurement to foreign suppliers also needs to be 
modeled, 
•  non-agricultural subsidies (which are estimated to be around 60 percent of all 
direct government subsidies globally) are not modeled for removal in the reform 
scenarios; 
•  some of the productive factors initially absorbed to fuel reform-induced output 
growth, particularly unskilled labor, may have been previously underemployed; 
•  monopolistic competition and product variety/heterogeneity between firms needs 
to be modeled; 
•  price elasticities in the standard GTAP model arguably err on the low side; 
•  endogenous growth effects need to be included as a benefit; 
                                                 
25 To the extent that the gains to preference-receiving developing countries are offset by losses to other 
countries because of trade diversion, the global welfare effects of accounting for preferences (given the 
smallness of recipient economies) will be very small. The GTAP Version 6.0 database is expected to 
include preferences when it is released in mid-2004, so future modelling studies should be able to account 





•  account needs to be taken of wasteful spending of resources on lobbying, as that 
will fall if assistance to industries (including re-instrumentation of existing 
protection) is announced to be a thing of the past;  
•  if trade reform encourages domestic policy and foreign exchange policy reforms 
as well, the benefits from those changes too need to be added; and, perhaps most 
important of all, 
•  the counterfactual to reform is not the status quo as assumed by modelers but 
increased protection, particularly for agriculture and conceivably also for other 
sectors without tariff bindings in place or for which technical barriers to trade or 
anti-dumping duties may then restrain trade. 
With these claims and counter-claims it is not possible to be precise about the 
gross benefits that would result from any particular reform such as a halving of subsidies 
and trade barriers. A lower-bound estimate might be that provided in the IRS/MC part of 
the FMT study, which is the only study to consider cuts to bound (as distinct from 
applied) tariffs. That estimate amounts to 0.67 percent of GDP in 1997. It contrasts with 
the estimate from the BDS study, in which services trade liberalization includes dramatic 
growth in foreign direct investment. The latter’s gain amounts to 3.0 percent of GDP in 
2005. The HRTG study is between those two but only refers to goods trade reform. In the 
light of these estimates it is assumed in what follows that the comparative static gains 
from a 50 percent reform after full adjustment is an unweighted average of the BDS and 
FMT estimates, which is 1.8 percent of GDP for the world as a whole and 2.5 percent for 
developing countries (implying 1.6 percent for developed countries). And it is assumed 
that those gains will accrue fully after a five-year phase-in period, prior to which the 
gains will begin in 2006 at one-fifth the full amount as of 2010 and rise by a further one-
fifth each year until 2010. 
There are dynamic gains from trade to consider in addition to those comparative 
static ones (not to mention the net benefits from non-farm subsidy cuts and the potentially 
massive gains from freeing up migration). The experiences of successful reformers such 
as Korea, China, India and Chile suggest trade opening immediately boosts GDP growth 
rates by several percentage points. To err on the conservative side, it is assumed here that 
reform boosts GDP growth rates – projected to 2015 by the World Bank (2003, Table 
A3.1) to be 2.7 percent for developed countries and 4.6 percent for developing countries 
– by one-sixth for developed countries and one-third for developing countries, that is, to 
3.1 and 6.1 percent, respectively and hence from 3.2 to 3.8 percent globally. Those rates 
are assumed to continue to 2050.
26 
To move from those gross effects to the net effects of these assumptions, it is 
necessary to consider the economic costs associated with reform, and also associated 
social and environmental benefits and costs. 
 
4.2 Economic costs of reducing subsidies and trade barriers 
 
The above benefits from reform are not costless of course. Expenditure on 
negotiating, and on supporting policy think tanks and the like to develop and disseminate 
a convincing case for reform, could be expanded many fold before running into declining 
                                                 
26 It may be that the growth rate rises more than this initially and then fades in later decades, in which case 





returns. But even if it did expand enormously, the increase globally would be trivial 
compared with the gains from reform (less than two billion dollars per year over the next 
five years).  
Of much more significance are the private costs of adjustment for firms and 
workers as reform forces some industries to downsize or close to allow others to expand 
(Matusz and Tarr 2000; Francois 2003). Those costs are ignored in the full-employment 
CGE models discussed above.  
There are also social costs to consider. They include social safety net provisions 
in so far as such schemes are developed/drawn on by losers from reform (e.g., 
unemployment payments plus training grants to build up new skills so displaced workers 
can earn the same wage as before), and perhaps increased costs of crime in so far as its 
incidence rises with transitional unemployment.  
All three types are one-off costs to weigh against the non-stop flow of economic 
benefits from reform. The private and social costs of adjustment tend to be smaller, the 
longer the phase-in period or smaller the tariff or subsidy cut per year (Furusawa and Lai 
1999). Also, CGE simulation studies suggest that the annual change in an industry’s 
terms of trade due to phased trade reform is typically very minor relative to changes due 
to exchange rate fluctuations, technological improvements, preference shifts and other 
economic shocks and structural developments associated with normal economic growth 
(Anderson et al. 1997; Dixon et al. 2000). 
Estimates of the magnitude of those costs are difficult to generate, but all 
available estimates suggest they are minor relative to the benefits from reform. An early 
study by Magee (1972) for the United States estimated the cost of job changes including 
temporary unemployment to be one-eighth of the benefits from tariff and quota 
elimination initially. Even assuming that transition took as many as five years, he 
estimated a benefit/cost ratio of 25. A subsequent study which examined a 50 percent cut 
in US tariffs (but not quotas) came up with a similar benefit/cost estimate (Baldwin, 
Mutti and Richardson 1980). In more recent debates about trade and labor, analysts have 
had difficulty finding a strong link between import expansion and increased 
unemployment (see Greenaway and Nelson 2002). One example is a study of the four 
largest EU economies’ imports from East Asia (Bentivogli and Pagano 1999). Another 
European example is a study of the UK footwear industry: liberalizing that market would 
incur unemployment costs only in the first year, because of the high job turnover in that 
industry, and those estimated costs are less than 1.5 percent of the benefits from cutting 
that protection (Winters and Takacs 1991). A similar-sized estimate is provided by de 
Melo and Tarr (1990) using a CGE model that focuses just on US textile, steel and auto 
protection cuts and drawing on estimates of the cost of earnings lost by displaced workers 
(later reported by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993). For developing countries also 
the evidence seems to suggest low costs of adjustment, not least because trade reform 
typically causes a growth spurt (Krueger 1983). In a study of 13 liberalization efforts for 
nine developing countries, Michaely et al. (1991) found only one example where 
employment was not higher within a year. A similar study for Mauritius by Milner and 
Wright (1998) also found trade opening to be associated with employment growth rather 
than decline.
27 
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If the adjustment costs are so small and may lead to more rather than less jobs 
even during the adjustment period, why are governments so reluctant to open their 
economies? The reason is because the losses in jobs and asset values are very obvious 
and concentrated whereas the gains in terms of new job and investment opportunities are 
thinly spread, are less-easily attributed to the trade reform, and are taken up often by 
people other than those losing from the reform.
28 As discussed in Section 2.3 above, the 
few losers are prepared to support politicians who resist protection cuts, while the gains 
are sufficiently small per consumer and unassisted firm as to make it not worthwhile for 
those many potential gainers to get together to lobby for reform, particularly given their 
greater free-rider problem in acting collectively (Olsen 1965). Hence the need for 
publicly funded trade policy think-tanks and the like to play an advocacy role. 
A prime example of the role analysis can play has to do with effects on 
developing countries in reforms to support for agriculture in OECD economies. The 
primary channel for such effects is through the terms of trade, which in turn depend in 
part on whether a country is a net exporter or importer of the affected OECD products. 
Long-term support for agriculture in OECD countries, coupled with often-negative 
assistance to farmers in many developing countries, has left developing countries as a 
group dependent on imports of these subsidized products. As a result, an across-the-board 
cut in all domestic support for OECD agriculture leads to welfare losses for many 
developing countries and to declines in farm incomes in Europe, Japan and North 
America. Such a reform package is therefore unlikely to be implemented on its own. An 
alternative approach is to focus on broad-based reductions in market price support, as has 
begun occurring in the EU where domestic support has increasingly replaced border 
measures. As Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney (2003) show, a shift from market price 
support to land-based payments could generate a win-win-win outcome whereby OECD 
                                                                                                                                                 
where trade taxes account for only 1 and 3 percent of government revenue, respectively. For lower middle-
income countries that share is 9 percent, and it is more than 20 percent for more than a dozen low-income 
countries for which data are available, so how concerned should those poorer countries be? The answer 
depends on whether/how much that revenue would fall and, if it does fall, on whether/how much more 
costly would be the next best alternative means of raising government revenue. On the first of those two 
points, government revenue from import taxes will rise rather than fall with reform if the reform involves 
replacing, with less-prohibitive tariffs, any of import quotas or bans, or tariffs that are prohibitive (or nearly 
so) or which encourage smuggling or under-invoicing or corruption by customs officials. It is possible even 
in a tariff-only regime that lower tariffs lead to a sufficiently higher volume and value of trade that the 
aggregate tariff collection rises. Examples of recent trade policy reforms that led to increased tariff revenue 
are Chile and Mexico (Bacchetta and Jansen 2003, p. 15). See also Greenaway and Milner (1993) and Nash 
and Takacs (1998). Since the economy is enlarged by opening up, income and consumption tax collections 
will automatically rise too. On the second point, about the cost of raising government revenue by other 
means if tax revenue does fall, Corden (1997, Ch. 4) makes it clear that in all but the poorest of countries it 
will be more rather than less efficient to collect tax revenue in other ways. Even countries as poor as 
Cambodia have managed to introduce a value added tax. Hence from a global viewpoint there is no 
significant cost that needs to be included in response to this concern. To the extent subsidies are also cut as 
part of the reform, the chances of government revenue rising are even greater. Income and consumption tax 
revenue also will rise as the economy expands following reform. In any case CGE modellers typically alter 
those other tax rates when trade tax revenues change so as to keep the overall government budget 
unchanged. 
28 In the Australian context of high unemployment in the latter 1970s, Max Corden was prompted to write a 
deliberately non-technical paper called ‘Tell us where the new jobs will come from?’ because he knew the 
answer was not obvious to non-economists (Corden 1979). The paper proved so popular that thousands of 





farm incomes are maintained and yet world price distortions are reduced and economic 
welfare rises for most developing countries and globally. Provided these increased 
domestic support payments are not linked to output or variable inputs, the trade-distorting 
and welfare-reducing effects are likely to be small, thereby providing an effective way of 
offsetting the potential losses that would otherwise be sustained by OECD farmers. This 
type of policy re-instrumentation increases the probability that such reforms are 
politically acceptable in the reforming economies while simultaneously increasing the 
likelihood that they will be beneficial to developing countries. That analysis suggests 
developing country governments should focus their efforts on improved access to OECD 
food markets while permitting wealthy countries to increase their decoupled domestic 
payments as import tariffs are lowered. 
So as not to exaggerate the net gains from trade reform, it is assumed here that 
there would be an adjustment period as long as five years following a 50 percent across-
the-board liberalization, and that in each of those years the adjustment costs would be as 
much as 30 percent of the annual comparative static benefits as of 2010 (and zero 
thereafter). That amounts to $219 billion per year during 2006 to 2010 globally, of which 
$64 billion is expended in developing countries, when expressed in 2002 US dollars by 
using the projection to 2010 of global GDP provided by the World Bank (2003, Table 
A3.1).  
A 100 percent (25 percent) liberalization would yield roughly twice (half) the 
gross benefits as a 50 percent liberalization but would have a much lower (higher) 
probability of being politically acceptable. This is because adjustment costs would be 
proportionately greater (less) with the bigger (smaller) reform. For the purposes of 
comparison, it is assumed here that a 100 (25) percent liberalization would involve 
adjustment costs equal to 40 (25) percent of the annual comparative static benefits as of 
2010 and zero thereafter, instead of the 30 percent assumed for a halving of subsidies and 
trade barriers. 
 
4.3 Social and environmental benefits and costs of reducing subsidies and trade 
barriers 
 
Because trade reform generates large and on-going economic gains while 
incurring comparatively minor one-off adjustment costs, it would allow individuals and 
governments to spend more on other pressing problems, thereby indirectly contributing to 
the alleviation of other challenges facing society. But in addition, trade reform would also 
directly alleviate some of those challenges. This section first focuses on the impact of 
trade reform on poverty alleviation, since that is the solution to many of the world’s 
problems. It then turns to trade reform’s impact on the environment, before briefly 
commenting on its impact on several of the other specific challenges being addressed in 
this project, namely climate change, communicable diseases, conflicts, education under-
investment, financial instability, poor governance and corruption, population and 






4.3.1 Poverty alleviation 
 
Evidence presented by Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Sala-i-Martin (2002) among 
others suggests aggregate economic growth differences have been largely responsible for 
the differences in poverty alleviation across regions. Initiatives that boost economic 
growth are therefore likely to be helpful in the fight against poverty, and trade 
liberalization is such an initiative. But cuts to subsidies and trade barriers also alter 
relative product prices domestically and in international markets, which in turn affect 
factor prices. Hence the net effect on poverty depends also on the way those price 
changes affect poor households’ expenditure and their earnings net of remittances. If the 
consumer and producer price changes (whether due to own-country reforms and/or those 
of other countries) are pro-poor, then they will tend to reinforce any positive growth 
effects of trade reform on the poor. 
The effects of trade reform on global poverty can be thought of at two levels: on 
the income gap between developed and developing countries, and on poor households 
within developing countries. On the first, the CGE estimates surveyed above suggest that 
current developing countries, which produced just 19 percent of global GDP in 2002, 
would enjoy nearly half of the net present value of the global static plus dynamic gains to 
2050 from halving trade barriers (see Section 4.4 below). Clearly that will reduce 
substantially the income gap between developed and poorer countries on average.  
How poor households within developing countries are affected is more difficult to 
say (Winters 2002; McCulloch, Winters and Cirera 2001). What is clear from Table 2 is 
that the agricultural policies of developed countries provide a major source of developing 
country gains from reform, and lowering barriers to textiles and clothing trade also is 
important. Both would boost the demand for unskilled labor and for farm products 
produced in poor countries. Since two-thirds of the world’s poor live in rural areas and, in 
least-developed countries, the proportion is as high as 90 percent (OECD 2003a, p. 3), 
and since most poor rural households are net sellers of farm labor and/or food, one would 
expect such reforms to reduce the number in absolute poverty (Anderson 2004; Cline 
2004a).
29 A preliminary analysis by Hertel, Ivanic, Perckel and Cranfield (2003), in 
which GTAP results are carefully combined with household income and expenditure 
survey data for 14 developing countries, tests this hypothesis and finds strong support for 
it in most of the 14 cases considered.  
 
4.3.2 The environment 
 
The effects of trade reform on the environment have been the focus of much 
theoretical and empirical analysis since the 1970s and especially in the past dozen or so 
years (Copland and Taylor 2003; Beghin et al. 2002). Until recently environmentalists 
have tended to focus mainly on the direct environmental costs they perceive from trade 
reform, just as they have with other areas of economic change.
30 That approach does not 
acknowledge areas where the environment might have been improved, albeit indirectly, 
as a result of trade reform (e.g., from less production by pollutive industries that were 
                                                 
29 Das (2001) describes independent India’s lack of openness prior to the 1990s as ‘a great betrayal’ that 
kept hundreds of millions of people in poverty for two generations longer than necessary. 





previously protected). Nor does it weigh the costs of any net worsening of the 
environment against the economic benefits of policy reform of the sort described above.  
The reality is that while the environmental effects of reform will differ across 
sectors and regions of the world, some positive and some negative, there are many 
examples where cuts to subsidies and trade barriers would reduce environmental damage 
(Anderson 1992; Irwin 2002, pp. 48-54). For some time the OECD has been encouraging 
analysis of these opportunities (OECD 1996, 1997, 1998, 2003b). Environmental NGOs 
are increasingly recognizing them, with Greenpeace currently focusing on energy 
subsidies, WWF on fisheries subsidies (WWF 2001), and IISD and Friends of the Earth 
on subsidy reforms generally (e.g., Myers and Kent 1998; FOE et al. 2003). They and the 
better-informed development NGOs such as Oxfam seem to be coming to the view that 
the net social and environmental benefits from reducing subsidies and at least some trade 
barriers may indeed be positive rather than negative, and that the best hope of reducing 
environmentally harmful subsidies and trade barriers is via the WTO’s multi-issue, 
multilateral trade negotiations process. 
If there remains a concern that the net effect of trade reform on the environment 
may be negative nationally or globally, that should be a stimulus to check whether first-
best environmental policy measures are in place and set at the optimal level of 
intervention, rather than a reason for not reducing trade distortions. This is because if 
they are so set, we would then know that the direct economic gains from opening to trade 
would exceed society’s evaluation of any extra environmental damage, other things equal 
(Corden 1997, Ch. 13).  
Much environmental damage in developing countries is a direct consequence of 
poverty (e.g., the slash-and-burn shifting agriculture of landless unemployed squatters). 
In so far as trade reform reduces poverty, so it will reduce such damage. More generally, 
the relationships between per capita income and a wide range of environmental indicators 
have been studied extensively. Because richer people have a greater ability to demand a 
clean environment, income rises tend to be associated with better environmental 
outcomes once incomes rise above certain levels.
31 Even though more pollutive products 
are being consumed as incomes rise, many abatement practices have been spreading fast 
enough to more than compensate. And openness to trade accelerates that spread of 
abatement ideas and technologies, making their implementation in developing countries 
affordable at ever-earlier stages of development. 
Estimating the global cost to society of all environmental damage that might 
accompany a reduction in subsidies and trade barriers, net of all environmental gains, is 
extraordinarily difficult both conceptually and empirically.
32 In the absence of any 
                                                 
31 This is the theme of the recent book by Hollander (2003). For statistical evidence of the extent to which 
different environmental indicators first worsen and then improve as incomes rise (sometimes called the 
environmental Kuznets curve), see the special issue of the journal Environment and Development 
Economics, Volume 2, Issue 4 in 1997 and the more-recent papers by and cited in Harbaugh, Levinson and 
Wilson (2002) and Cole (2003). 
32 A beginning nonetheless is being made, with several governments funding ex ante evaluations of the 
WTO Doha round’s potential impact on the environment. The EU’s efforts include a workshop on 
methodological issues which are laid out in CEPII (2003), and further work has been contracted to the 
University of Manchester whose progress can be traced at http://idpm.man.ac.uk/sia-
trade/Consultation.htm. Ex post analyses are also being undertaken by NGOs. See, for example, Bermudez 





sufficiently comprehensive estimates it will be assumed that the net effect of reform on 
the environment would be zero. 
 
4.3.3 Climate change 
 
When the environmental impact is global rather than local, as with greenhouse 
gases and their alleged impact on climate change, international environmental agreements 
may be required (see Cline 2004b). When developing countries are not party to such 
agreements, however, it is difficult to prevent ‘leakage’ through a re-location of carbon-
intensive activities to those non-signatories. An alternative or supplementary approach 
that is likely to achieve at least some emission reductions, and at the same time generate 
national and global economic benefits rather than costs, involves lowering coal subsidies 
and trade barriers. Past coal policies have encouraged excessive production of coal in a 
number of industrial countries and excessive coal consumption in numerous developing 
countries including transition economies. Phasing out those distortionary policies has 
both improved the economy and lowered greenhouse gas emissions globally – a ‘no 
regrets’ outcome or win-win Pareto improvement for the economy and the environment 
(Anderson and McKibbin 2000). Additional opportunities for reducing greenhouse gases 
through cutting energy subsidies are pointed to in the new UNEP study by von Moltke, 
McKee and Morgan (2004). 
 
4.3.4 Communicable diseases  
  Communicable diseases are more common among the poor, so again trade 
reform’s contribution to poverty alleviation will in turn impact on human health in 
general and the reduced incidence of diseases in particular. Furthermore, the greater 
openness of economies ensures medicines and prevention technologies are more 
widespread and cheaper, particularly following the Doha WTO conference of trade 
ministers and the subsequent Decision of 30 August 2003 on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health. That Decision by the WTO General Council ensures developing country 
governments can issue compulsory licenses to allow other companies to make a patented 
product or use a patented process under license without the consent of the patent owner, 
while developing countries unable to produce pharmaceuticals domestically can now 
import generic copies of patented drugs made under compulsory licensing by other 
developing countries.  
4.3.5 Conflicts  
 
Openness tends to break down the common prejudices that accompany insularity, 
and to broaden mutual understanding between people with different cultures and customs. 
It also expands economic interdependence among countries, which raises the opportunity 
cost of entering into conflicts with trading partners. In so far as it reduces income 
inequality across countries, then that too diffuses tension between nations – a point that 
has even greater significance following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Indeed 
there is now statistical support for Immanuel Kant’s hypothesis that durable peace is 





organizations: Oneal and Russett (2000) find that all three contribute independently to 
more peaceful relationships with other countries.
33 And casual observation suggests that 
more-autarchic economies tend to be less democratic. 
  Where openness involves also greater international migration, there tends to be 
less inter-cultural conflict and more social gains from multiculturalism. Conversely, it is 
in societies that resent immigrants and impose strict migration quotas where cultural 
clashes seem to be more common. Clashes between ethnic groups are also more common 
where a minority prospers greatly relative to the majority or other significant minorities 
(Chua 2003). Such income and wealth inequality within a country tends to be less 
common the more open is the economy, at least after the initial adjustments to reform 
(Williamson 2002). 
 
4.3.6 Education under-investment  
 
  Parents and governments are less likely to under-invest in education the higher 
their incomes, other things equal. So to the extent that trade reform raises incomes, it 
contributes to better educational outcomes. That is especially so for the very poorest who 
cannot afford even primary education: a slight increase in the cash income of poor farm 
families, for example following a reform-induced increase in international prices of farm 
products, can make it possible to pay the (often relatively high) school fees that are 
otherwise unaffordable. 
 
4.3.7 Financial instability 
 
  Trade reform ‘thickens’ international markets by raising the share of global 
production that passes through them. That typically reduces the variation across time in 
prices for traded products. It also expands the demand for international financial services 
to transfer the required payments and often to provide temporary credit. Together these 
forces contribute to the long-term stability of financial markets. 
  Openness also tends to reduce inflation. It can do so by increasing competition in 
domestic markets, which drives down prices and reduces political pressure on the central 
bank to inflate, and by providing more options for people to hold savings in foreign 
currencies, which reduces the ability of governments to inflate savings away (Rogoff 
2003). 
 
4.3.8 Poor governance and corruption  
 
  A tolerance for subsidies and trade barriers breeds rent-seeking by special 
interests seeking protectionist policies for their industry. If those policies include import 
licensing, that breeds corruption through encouraging bureaucrats responsible for 
allocating licenses to accept bribes from would-be importers. Together those activities 
ensure that the welfare costs of trade barriers are higher than is typically measured, since 
a share of the private rents they generate are wasted in these lobbying activities. Tax-
                                                 
33 A recent survey of the evidence did not find a significant direct link between poverty and terrorism, 
however. Rather, Krueger and Maleckova (2002) concluded that terrorism was more a response to political 





avoiding corruption is also encouraged in the case of import tariffs, for example through 
bribing customs officers or through smuggling. For these reasons it is not surprising that 
statistical analysis has found less-open economies to be more corrupt (Ades and Di Tella 
1999).  
 
4.3.9 Population and migration issues 
 
  The challenge in developed countries of a shortage of low-skilled workers has 
been eased by merchandise trade with and FDI flows to labor-abundant developing 
countries, most notably China in the past two decades. But that has been far from 
sufficient to equalize wages across countries. Historical experience in the 50 years to 
World War I showed that by far the fastest way to bring about a convergence in living 
standards is through international migration (Williamson 2002). Notwithstanding the 
liberalization of much merchandise trade post-World War II, and the opportunity through 
the WTO’s Doha round to reduce those and services trade barriers further, the CGE 
analyses by Hamilton and Whalley (1984) and Winters et al. (2003) suggest that this will 
still be the case in the foreseeable future. When coupled with an aging population in 
developed countries, there is a compelling case for them to expand their quotas on 
immigrants from developing countries. Indeed Mattoo and Subramanian (2003) argue 
that this would be essential if the Doha round is to deliver on its promise of being 
development-friendly.  
 
4.3.10 Under-nutrition and hunger 
 
  Food security is always a great concern in poor countries, especially those 
dependent on food imports where there are fears that reducing agricultural subsidies and 
protectionism globally will raise the price of those imports. But food security is defined 
as always having access to the minimum supply of basic food necessary for survival, so 
enhancing food security is mainly about alleviating poverty. That suggests this issue 
needs to be considered from a household rather than national perspective.
34 If an 
international food price rise from trade reform abroad is transmitted domestically, the 
vast majority of the poor in low-income countries would benefit directly. This is because 
the poor are found predominantly in farm households and are net sellers of food. Even 
poor landless farm laborers who are net buyers of food would benefit indirectly from an 
agricultural price rise via a rise in the demand for their unskilled farm labor if that raises 
                                                 
34 Even from a national viewpoint, it is not necessarily the case that a country that is currently a net food 
importer will lose from a rise in the international price of food. If, for example, it is close to self-sufficient 
in food without price supports, and reform abroad raises the international price of food, it may switch to 
become sufficiently export-oriented that its net national economic welfare rises. A second possibility is that 
a developing country's own policies are sufficiently biased against food production that the country is a net 
importer, despite having a comparative advantage in food. In that case, it has been shown that the 
international price rise can improve national economic welfare, even if the price change is not sufficient to 
turn that distorted economy into a net food exporter (Anderson and Tyers 1993). That comes about because 
the higher price of food attracts mobile resources away from more-distorted sectors, thereby improving the 
efficiency of national resource allocation. Because of these two possibilities, the number of poor countries 
for whom a rise in international food prices might cause some hardship is much smaller than the number 





their wage enough to more than offset the rise in food prices in rural areas. The earnings 
prospects for other landless rural poor will have risen too, along with the demand for 
labor in local enterprises that grow as farmers spend their enhanced income on simple 
manufactures and services produced nearby. Since the typically more affluent people in 
cities would find it relatively easy to pay a little extra for food, the only other major 
vulnerable group is the under-employed urban poor. But even that group may not be 
worse off in so far as trade reform generates a more-than-offsetting increase in the 
demand for that group’s unskilled labor, which is used relatively intensively in (often 
informal sector) services or, if developed countries were to reduce also their barriers to 
imports of textiles and clothing, the apparel industry. 
What about in developing countries where multilateral agricultural trade 
liberalization means lower domestic prices for agricultural products because such 
countries had kept domestic food prices above international levels via import restrictions? 
It is true that removing those distortions will reduce farm incomes in those countries (but 
by more for larger than smaller farms), and urban households will benefit from lower 
food prices. However, food self-sufficiency will fall – and it is the fall in both farm 
earnings and food self-sufficiency that focuses the attention of those who argue that 
agricultural trade liberalization is bad for poor households. Focusing on just the direct 
effects of agricultural trade policy reform can be misleading, however, not least because 
it does not take account of the fact that such reform would be undertaken in the context of 
multilateral, economy-wide liberalization. Being multilateral means that other countries’ 
farm protection cuts raise international food prices, and so less of a price fall occurs than 
when a country cuts its agricultural protection unilaterally. And being economy-wide 
means the decline in demand for farm labor is more or less offset by a growth in demand 
for labor in expanding non-farm industries such as apparel.
35  
Hunger and under-nutrition can be eased by trade not only in goods but also in 
agricultural technologies, in particular newly bred varieties of staple crops (Runge et al. 
2003). The introduction of high-yielding dwarf wheat and rice varieties during the Green 
Revolution that began in Asia in the 1960s is a previous case in point, whereby producers 
and consumers shared the benefits in terms of higher farm profits and lower consumer 
prices for cereals. A prospective case in point is the possibility of breeding crop varieties 
that are not only less-costly to grow but are ‘nutriceuticals’ in the sense they contain 
vitamin and mineral supplements. The most promising is so-called ‘golden rice’. 
Consumers in many of poor countries suffer from chronic vitamin A deficiency that can 
lead to blindness, weakened immune systems, and increased morbidity and mortality for 
children and pregnant and lactating women. Golden rice has been genetically engineered 
to contain a higher level of beta-carotene in the endosperm of the grain and thereby 
provide a vitamin A supplement. By being cheaper and/or more nutritionally beneficial, it 
would improve the health of poor people and thereby also boost their labor productivity. 
Anderson, Jackson and Nielsen (2004) estimate that the latter economic benefit from this 
                                                 
35 These expectations are supported by the recent household-focused CGE analysis by Hertel, Ivanic, 
Preckel and Cranfield (2003). An interesting exception, though, is Mexico: poverty there has been reduced 
by Mexico’s preferential access into the US market via NAFTA, and the benefit of those preferences would 
decrease with multilateral reform because Mexico would then have to share some of those earlier gains 
with other developing countries. This result highlights the beggar-thy-neighbour nature of FTAs, as 





new technology could be as much as 10 times greater than just the traditional benefits of 
lower production costs – not to mention that poor people would live longer and healthier 
lives. This new technology has yet to be adopted, however, because the European Union 
and some other countries will not import grain from countries that produce food that may 
contain genetically modified organisms (GMOs) – even though there is no evidence that 
GM foods are a danger to human health (see, e.g., King 2003). That trade barrier may be 
challenged at the WTO because it is seen by adopters of GM corn and soybean simply as 
a disguised form of economic protection for European farmers (an hypothesis that is not 
inconsistent with empirical research showing that the EU’s moratorium on GM food 
boosts EU farm household incomes even though it denies them the opportunity to adopt 
the new technology – see Anderson and Jackson 2004).   
 
4.4 Global net present value and benefit/cost ratio from lowering subsidies and trade 
barriers by 2010 
 
The previous section points to numerous examples of net social benefits from 
trade liberalization, but is unable to quantify them let alone all the other social and 
environmental benefits and costs of such policy reform. For present purposes of 
estimating the net present value of this opportunity to reduce subsidies and trade barriers, 
they will therefore be ignored even though, like the net gains from migration, they are 
most likely positive and large.  
With that in mind, lower-bound estimates of the overall net benefits from halving 
subsidies and trade barriers are calculated as the differences each year between the 
economic benefits and costs discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 above. As shown in Figure 
1, these benefits would roughly double the annual increment to global GDP after the 
initial adjustment period. Even if the benefits ceased after 50 years, their net present 
value in 2005 at a discount rate of 5 percent would be $23,040 billion for the world 
economy, of which $11,500 billion or almost half would accrue to the current developing 
countries (expressed in 2002 US dollars, when global and developing country GDPs were 
$32,016 and $6,079 billion, respectively). That implies a benefit/cost ratio of 24.3 
globally and 37.9 for developing countries. If the dynamic gains (in addition to 
prospective migration gains and social and environmental net benefits) are ignored, the 
global gains are $17,100 billion in terms of net present value, implying a benefit/cost 
ratio of 18.1 for the world as a whole. Table 4 summarizes these results as the Optimistic 
Doha opportunity. For comparison it also shows the benefit/cost ratios for a 100 percent 
liberalization and for a Pessimistic Doha outcome of a 25 percent liberalization, assuming 
proportionately higher (lower) costs of adjustment when the reform is greater (smaller) as 
discussed in Section 4.2 above.   
Even if one believes the probability of a successful Doha round is low, that it 
might take some years beyond 2005 to complete and beyond 2010 before its full impact 
is felt, that it might involve much less than a halving of subsidies and trade barriers, that 
the comparative static gains are closer to the lowest estimate in Table 3, and that the 
dynamic gains would boost GDP growth rates by less than one-sixth for developed 
countries and one-third for developing countries, the alternative net present value 
estimates one would generate are likely still to be enormous – both absolutely and 





the counterfactual was not the status quo but a rise in protectionism and a decline in the 
WTO institution and the rules-based global trading system it supports.  
The estimated net benefit to developing countries after adjusting to greater access 
to developed country markets is large compared with official development assistance 
currently provided by OECD countries to developing countries (around $60 billion per 
year). It is large also compared with the foreign direct investment (FDI) funds that flow 
from OECD to developing countries (between $120 and $150 billion per year). Yet it 
would not be costly for developed countries to provide that greater market access. On the 
contrary, those countries would gain even more in dollar terms than developing countries 
from such policy reform (see Table 2), giving them extra resources to expand their 
development assistance and FDI and thereby to further reduce global income inequality 
and poverty (particularly if non-farm subsidies also were cut). All that is required is bold 
leadership to grasp the opportunities before us for unilateral and multilateral trade reform 








The theory and available evidence surveyed above show that subsidies and trade 
barriers are not only economically wasteful but many also have harmful social and 
environmental effects. Even where the latter effects are not harmful, there are almost 
always cheaper ways of obtaining those social and environmental effects than via trade 
and subsidy measures. The reasons these inefficient measures persist is partly lack of 
understanding of the benefits being foregone, but mostly it is because a small number of 
vested interests lobby for their retention. The challenge is to find politically feasible 
opportunities for ridding the world of subsidies and trade barriers. This paper suggests the 
most obvious way is currently before us in the form of the Doha Development Agenda of 
multilateral trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization. Seizing that 
opportunity for reform could reduce government outlays by hundreds of millions of 
dollars. It could also allow citizens to spend more on other pressing problems (because 
under freer trade the world’s resources would be allocated more efficiently), thereby 
indirectly contributing to opportunities to alleviate other challenges facing the world; and 
it could also directly alleviate poverty and thereby reduce environmental degradation and 
address other challenges such as communicable diseases, conflicts and arms proliferation, 
education under-investment, corruption, migration issues, water issues, and under-





Appendix: The global, economy-wide GTAP database and model 
 
   To estimate the potential economy-wide effects of regional and multilateral trade 
liberalizations, by far the most common methodology since the 1980s has involved a global 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and database.
36 It is a daunting task to compile 
and periodically update all the necessary data for such a model so, under the direction of 
Professor Tom Hertel of Purdue University, a consortium was established more than a decade 
ago for this purpose. Known as GTAP (the Global Trade Analysis Project), it is currently 
providing Version 5 of its database, with Version 6 to be released in the spring of 2004. That 
latest database provides reconciled production, consumption and bilateral goods and services 
trade data plus subsidies and trade distortion estimates
37 (including developing country 
preferences) as of 2001 for 78 countries or country groups spanning the world, each divided 
into 57 sectors spanning the entire economy (see www.gtap.org). Earlier versions based on 
1997 or 1995 data had less country and product disaggregation and did not include tariff 
preferences. This database is the foundation of most global CGE trade models in use today. 
The current version is described in detail in Dimaranan and McDougall (2002). 
  In addition, the GTAP Center at Purdue University has developed its own family of 
applied general equilibrium models (Hertel 1997). The core GTAP model is a standard, multi-
region CGE model that is currently being used by several hundred researchers in scores of 
countries on five continents. (The GTAP database builds on contributions from many of these 
individuals, as well as the national and international agencies in the GTAP Consortium.) 
Perfect competition and constant returns to scale are assumed for all sectors of each economy 
in the core comparative static version.  
  The GTAP model utilizes a sophisticated representation of consumer demands that allows 
for differences in both the price and income responsiveness of demand in different regions 
depending upon both the level of development of the region and the particular consumption 
patterns observed in that region. On the supply-side, differences in factor endowments within 
and between countries interact with different sectoral factor intensities to drive changes in the 
sectoral composition of output in response to structural or policy shocks. The GTAP production 
system distinguishes sectors by their intensities in five primary factors of production: 
agricultural land, other natural resources, unskilled labor time, skilled labor time, and physical 
capital. Thus in a region where physical capital is accumulating rapidly relative to other factors, 
for example, that region’s relatively capital intensive sectors tend to expand at the expense of 
other sectors. In addition to differences in intermediate input intensities, import intensities are 
also permitted to vary across uses. Since much trade is in intermediate inputs, the distinction 
between sales to final consumers and sales to other firms can be important. Lowering the cost 
of imported goods to consumers is quite different from lowering the cost of intermediate inputs 
to domestic firms that may be competing with imports in the final product market. As well, 
products are differentiated by place of production. The linkage between the different prices of a 
product is typically quite strong, but will depend on the degree of substitutability in 
consumption. In addition to matching up more effectively with reality, this approach has the 
advantage of permitting bilateral trade to be tracked, as opposed to simply reporting total 
exports net of imports. 
                                                 
36 On the need for adopting a general rather than partial equilibrium methodology, see Anderson (2002). 
37 Estimating the height of trade barriers is a non-trivial task in itself, even for merchandise (Evans 2003) 
but especially for services (Findlay and Warren 2001) and if technical barriers to trade are involved 
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ADFHHM (2002)  CRS/PC Goods only 2005 108 254 1995
BDS (2003)  IRS/MC Goods, 
services
 and FDI
2005 431 2080 1995
FMT (2003)  IRS/MC Goods and 
services
1997 113 367 1997
WBGEP (2003)  CRS/PC Goods only 2015 184 355 1997
WBGEP (2003)  CRS/PC plus 
productivity 
boost
Goods only 2015 539 832 1997
 
 










Table 2: Sectoral and regional
a contributions to comparative static estimates of economic 
welfare gains from completely removing goods trade barriers globally, post-
Uruguay Round, 2005 
 
(percent of total global gains) 
 
Liberalizing   Agriculture Other Textiles & Other  Total
Region:  Benefitting 
region 
and Food Primary Clothing Manufactures 
High Income   
   High Income  43.4 0.0 -2.3 -3.2 38.0
 Low Income  4.6 0.1 3.5 8.8 16.9
 Total  48.0 0.0 1.3 5.6 54.9
Low Income   
 High Income  4.4 0.1 4.1 10.9 19.5
 Low Income  12.3 1.0 1.4 10.9 25.6
 Total  16.7 1.1 5.5 21.7 45.1
All Countries   
 High Income  47.9 0.1 1.9 7.7 57.5
 Low Income  16.9 1.0 4.9 19.6 42.5
 Total  64.8 1.1 6.8 27.3 100.0
 
a High and low income here are short-hand for developed and developing countries. 
 





Table 3: Comparative static estimates of economic welfare gains from a 50 percent multilateral liberalization of goods and services trade 




























(a) Optimistic Doha round     
BDS (2003)  IRS/MC  Goods and 
services
 incl. FDI
Applied 2005 216 1040 1995 
FMT (2003)  IRS/MC  Goods and 
services
Bound 1997 88 196 1997 




Bound 1997 51 132 1997 
HRTG (2003)  CRS/PC  Goods only Applied 1997 97 186 1996 
 
(b) FTAA 
   
BDS (2003)  IRS/MC  Goods and 
services
 incl. FDI
Applied 2005 24 83 1995 
HHIK (2003) 
 
CRS/PC Goods  only Applied 1997 na 3 1997 
HRTG (2003)  CRS/PC  Goods only Applied 1997 6 4 1996 
a CRS/PC: constant returns to scale/perfect competition; IRS/MC: increasing returns to scale/monopolistic competition/firm-level differentiated products. 
Sources: Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2003); Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2003); Hertel, Hummels, Ivanic, and Keeney (2003); and 





Table 4: Summary of benefits and costs of liberalizing subsidies and trade barriers 
 
 (2002 US$ billion) 
 
Opportunity
















50% liberalization of 
trade barriers and 
agricultural subsidies
 
$23,040  $947  24.3  5% discount rate, 
benefits rise each year 
even after the five-year 
phase-in to 2010 
(because the economy 
is growing) and last to 
2050, costs are $219 
billion per year and 




of trade barriers and 
agricultural subsidies 
$46,080  $2,104  21.9  As above except costs 
are $583 billion per 
year 
Pessimistic Doha: 
25% liberalization of 
trade barriers and 
agricultural subsidies 
$11,520  $395  29.2  As above except costs 
are $91 billion per year 
 
 
a  Based on the estimates in the BDS study, the FTAA opportunity would yield benefits 
of (possibly very much) less than one-twelfth of that for the Optimistic Doha opportunity 
above, and a lower benefit/cost ratio, because of standard FTA complexities such as rules 
of origin. The EBA opportunity for least-developed countries to get preferential (duty- 
and quota-free) access to developed country markets would yield global benefits of less 
than one-hundredth of the above, and those benefits would diminish as and when 
developed countries lowered their MFN tariffs. While the least-developed countries 
would be the main beneficiaries in proportional terms from EBA, their benefit would be 
at the expense of other developing countries (including ones as poor as Vietnam) who 






Figure 1: Annual increment to global GDP without and with 50% cut to subsidies and trade barriers, 2006 
to 2050 
(in billions of 2002 US dollars)
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